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  1Abstract  
 
Land has had a crucial role in the rural-nationalist ideology, especially with respect to its scarcity. 
In this ideology the land itself embodies a symbolic meaning which could be referred to as the 
“national mother-earth” which must be protected from aliens. This was the reason why the 
governments of the ECE candidate countries asked and received a period of 7-12 years exemption 
from EU rules with respect to the free movement of capital for the purpose of purchasing agricultural 
land.  
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Introduction   
 
This paper deals with the emergence, causes and historical events of rural nationalism concerning 
national land protection from aliens.  
For the prospective new EU members agriculture was a crucial issue in the negotiations for 
accession. This was particularly the case for those countries which possess large agricultural areas 
(such as Hungary); they have tried to protect their national interests as much as possible. Among these 
interests the rate and sum of agricultural and rural (structural) subsidies seemed to be the most 
important, given that the development of agriculture depends to a great extent on these. However, 
many accession countries preferred to put the protection of national land against ownership by aliens 
at the top of their negotiating agenda. Negotiations concerning this question generally preceded the 
issue of subsidies and later received almost equal significance with them.   
This paper tries to explain the reasons of this preference. First, it examines how the facts support 
the official assertion that the sale of land to foreigners would cause land scarcity for domestic farmers. 
Second, it deals with the historical development of land ownership in different regions of Europe. 
Third, it investigates how the rural nationalist ideologies emerged and developed on the bases of 
history and historical land scarcity in the countries of the European periphery. Fourth, it deals with the 
survival of some nationalist ideologies at a time when their historical bases no longer exist.  
The paper is based on facts and data of economic policies and on theories of economic history 
and political economics. 
           
The sale of land to foreigners   
 
The free movement of capital was provided in the treaty of Rome. EC Article 54 (3) (e) of the EC 
Treaty provides that the Council and the Commission shall carry out their duty to enable a national of 
any Member State to acquire and use land and buildings situated in the territory of another Member 
State, insofar as this does not conflict with the principles of the common agricultural policy (van der 
Velde and Snyder, 1992). The free movement of capital within the EU was fully achieved in 1992. In 
its 2002 report on enlargement the Commission concluded that “the liberalization of capital 
movements in line with the acquis communitaire is now almost complete in most countries…but some 
countries still need to conclude the process of agricultural land reform” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2002).  
In the Hungarian negotiations in connection with agriculture and EU accession, exemption from 
EU rules about the acquisition of land by any EU national gained an issue of great importance. The 
1998-2002 center-right government asked for and received a seven years transition period after the 
accession in which foreigners would be prevented from buying agricultural land. The succeeding 
socialist government negotiated for and received a possible prolongation of the transition period by 3 
years (i. e. a prolongation of the transition period) if land prices remained lower than the EU average 
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development of viable farms.  
The reasoning of both governments was that with land prices being so low in Hungary it would 
make it possible for foreigners to buy large areas of land at cheap prices, thus causing the problem of 
land scarcity for domestic farmers. Only those self-employed foreigners who had farmed for three 
years on rented land and lived in Hungary would be exempt from the land-buying prevention. 
However, even this exemption was opposed by many politicians. Similar transitional periods have 
been granted in all ECE countries (except Slovenia). During this period the countries concerned can 
restrict the ability of non-residents to acquire agricultural land and forest (Grover, 2003).  The Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia have been granted a seven-year transitional period 
and Poland has been given a twelve-year period in which the mentioned restrictions will be in force. 
The transitional arrangements will be reviewed within three years of accession and they can be 
terminated or shortened by the EU. If there are serious disturbances in the agricultural land markets, or 
a threat of serious disturbance, the transition periods can be extended for up to a further three years for 
all the mentioned countries. 
The question could be raised: why is it that only agricultural land has received such attention? 
After all, the governments of transitional countries have been keen to invite foreign firms to buy 
national enterprises or establish new ones in the industry and service sectors. They are glad to have as 
much foreign direct investment in these sectors as possible. Most of the Hungarian food industry is in 
foreign hands: 57.4 per cent of capital present in the food industry in 2002 was of foreign origin 
(Kapronczai, 2003). At the same time the share of foreign capital in agriculture was not more than 7.1 
per cent (mainly in agricultural companies). Agriculture was mostly damaged in the early years of the 
transition in almost all the accession countries and it has hardly recovered since that time. Therefore it 
needs at least as much foreign direct investment as industry. Since agricultural production is confined 
to land, capital inflow would be confined to it as well. Land should be available for investors either in 
the form of rent or of ownership. In a market economy the decision concerning the choice of the form 
depends on the entrepreneur. If a government permits only the renting of land, -coupled with 
discriminative conditions - foreign investors tend to regard it as a restriction of their entrepreneur’s 
freedom. Consequently, many potential foreign entrepreneurs are discouraged from getting involved in 
any form of agricultural enterprise in those new EU countries which have brought restrictions into 
force. 
    
Is there a danger of land scarcity? 
 
Arguments claiming that if foreigners were to be able to buy land inexpensively in Hungary the 
domestic farmers would not have sufficient land for farming can be refuted easily. The counter-
argument is the present cheapness of the land itself. If land really was scarce the demand for it would 
be greater and land prices would be significantly higher than now. On the Western border of the 
country prices are much higher than elsewhere because there are already Austrian tenants (Erb, 2003) 
who are waiting for buying permission or who hold land with contracts that are not technically legal.  
    
 Data disprove land scarcity 
 
According to statistical data, land is not scarce in Hungary. The number of those working full-
time in agriculture has shrunk between 1990 and 2001 from 693,000 to 239,000 and their share in the 
total employment of the national economy has decreased from 14.2% to 6.2%. The share of agriculture 
in the GDP was 7.8% in 1991 and 3.8% in 2001. The number of individual part-time and full-time 
farms diminished between 1991 and 2000 from 1,396,000 to 959,000, i. e. by 31%. It is mainly farms 
of a size under 1 ha that have been abandoned. The uncultivated area increased between 1989 and 
2001 from 1,064,000 ha to 1,574,000 ha, i. e. by 48% (Structural Changes in Agriculture, 2003 and 
Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture 2002, 2003). The data demonstrate the fact that Hungarian farmers 
would not be prevented from buying land if they wanted to do so. Though the land concentration of 
individual farms appears to have been significant in recent years - as Table 1 shows – this has taken 
place mainly due to renting, not ownership. The number of individual farms under 1 ha has decreased 
from 81% to 72% of the total number of farms and their share of the land area has fallen from 17% to 
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from 0.1% to 0.7   % of the total number and their share in the land area has risen from 15.5% to 
almost 31 %. The concentration took place first of all in the larger farm categories. Table 2 shows that 
the larger the farm is, the more land it has which is rented.  
 
 





Number of farms  
(%) 
Share of farms in 
the agriculture area 
( %) 
Average farm size  
(ha) 
1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 
      
>1.0  81.4  71.9  16.8   6.8   0.2    0.2 
1.1-
5.0 
14.5  18.5  27.4  15.7   2.2    2.3 
5.1-
10.0 
 2.4   4.4  14.3  11.6   6.9    7.2 
10.1-
50.0 
 1.6   4.5  26.0  35.1  19.0   21.4 




Table 2. Share of rented land on individual farms 
 
 
Farm size ( ha) 
 
 












Sources: National farm surveys carried out by the Hungarian Statistical Office in 1994 and 2000. 
   
 
The land market is still weak in Hungary. It is weak partly owing to the weak demand, and partly 
owing to the postponed selling by those land owners who are waiting for higher prices.  The demand is 
weak because of the uncertain future of agricultural production, the still prevailing failings in the 
surveying, registration and consolidation of land, and the prevailing restrictions on ownership. 
Individual ownership of land is limited to 300 ha. Furthermore, foreigners, co-operatives and 
companies are prevented from buying agricultural land. All these aspects cause uncertainties in the 
market.  
On the supply side the postponed selling by absentee owners is causing problems.  A great part of 
the agricultural land area was effectively privatized after 1990 in favor of the former owners or their 
heirs (Swinnen, 1997).  However, many of the former owners and their heirs have migrated away and 
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remained in agriculture are now dead or have retired since the beginning of the systemic changes. 
Furthermore, many of the descendants of those once involved in agriculture have turned to other 
spheres of economic activity. As a result of these developments absentee ownership has become a 
general pattern. Although it would be rational for absentee owners to sell their land to those who want 
to cultivate it, this rarely happens.  Many owners are "sitting" on their rural property because land 
prices are low owing to the weak land market and the low agricultural incomes; thus these sitting 
owners are waiting for higher prices (Burger, 1998). However, land prices will not grow significantly 
until the demand for land increases and this depends on, among other things, the lifting of restrictions 
on the purchase of land. 
If economic data and facts do not support arguments about land scarcity, why are so many public 
figures opposed to the acquisition of land by foreigners?  In fact, the reasons are political and social 
rather than economic.  
    
The role of history           
 
The prevention of foreigners owning land became a principle of the 1990-94 center-right wing 
government and its followers. They claimed that the "Hungarian motherland" must not get into the 
hands of aliens. This sort of ideology is supported not only by rightists but also by some other people 
who feel that they are “real” patriots. It can be found in other ECE countries, as well. It can even be 
recognized in those Western European countries where there is a desire to protect the results of - 
sometimes relatively late - land reforms (Granberg et al. eds., 2001). In these Western countries there 
were - and still are - many restrictions on the selling and buying of land, there are limitations on the 
size of land which can be owned, and there are criteria for selecting the persons who are eligible to 
own land for the purpose of farming. In some countries the intention to preserve the results of land 
reforms is connected with sentiments against foreigners. Such sentiments are related to the aim of 
protecting domestic small farmers and/or because the countries in question have, at some stage(s) in 
their history, been occupied by foreign powers for shorter or longer periods. These countries are 
sensitive to those times when many of the big landowners in their territory were foreigners. 
In Hungary, and in some other ECE countries nationalist ideologies stem from similar facts. 
There was a hunger for land until land reforms were carried out after the Second World War. 
However, the reforms were soon followed by collectivization, which again deprived people of the 
opportunity to own land. The respective histories of Hungary and some other new EU members show 
that occupation by foreign powers has indeed been a notable and uncomfortable feature. However, 
these countries are now sovereign independent states and most of them have plenty of land available 
due to the much-reduced agricultural population. Yet despite this fact some political forces still 
attempt to enliven the old nationalist sentiments. In their arguments agricultural land is the symbol of 
the “motherland" and those countrymen who are tilling it are "maintaining the nation" and defending 
the motherland from aliens.           
In the core of Europe, in those “more fortunate” countries where  industrialization and rapid 
growth occurred much earlier than in  ECE, agricultural reforms were generally carried out  in the 18
th 
century (Ciepielewski, et al., 1980, Cameron, R., 1993, Burger, 1994). Feudalism and its remnants 
were abolished and thus tenure based on serfdom also disappeared to give way to the creation of 
tenant farms. Communal land was distributed. In England many large feudalist farms became 
capitalist tenant farms. In other countries most of the tenant farms became individually-owned small 
farms and during the land reforms a great number of large farms were distributed among smallholders. 
Agriculture was quickly modernized and mechanized everywhere and so the demand for labor 
diminished. Labor migrated into the industrial and service sectors. Governments generally supported 
agricultural modernization by developing the rural infrastructure of their countries, supporting rural 
investments, irrigation, drainage, land reclamation and consolidation projects, and creating a network 
of rural schools. They also provided cheap credits for farming and, later on, subsidies to support 
production and prices. What is perhaps most important of all, the governments of these more 
developed countries established the solid legal ground for individual farming, and in this way 
agriculture was fully integrated into the national economy. It can be seen that over time agriculture has 
grown at an equal or almost equal pace with other economic sectors. Most of the former agricultural 
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agricultural population have gradually approached the living standards and quality of life of the lower 
urban middle classes. 
What happened on the periphery of Europe was not the same as in the developed “core” 
countries. In the North- South- and East European countries (Wallerstein, 1984, Berend, 1996, 
Granberg et al. eds., 2001) industrialization and agricultural reforms took place much later than 
elsewhere. Emancipation of the serfs was carried out in most ECE countries only in the mid-19
th 
century. Large capitalist estates still operated on bases that could be recognized as feudal (e.g. share-
cropping, obligations to perform unpaid labor to pay off debt, rent payments, etc.) (Berend and Ránki, 
1974). Semi-feudal practices remained for a long time after the emancipation.  Many large estates 
were owned by absentee owners, the cultivation practices used on them were extensive, and their 
productivity was low. Few of them became intensive capitalist farms. Owners of those capitalist-type 
farms that did exist were often food- processing firms or foreigners. Small- and middle-size farms 
accounted for a much smaller part of the agricultural area than large estates. The peasantry was poor - 
much poorer than the small urban working class. In the countries of the periphery the state 
administration and government itself represented the large landowners of the ruling class and 
supported them. Smallholders in agriculture effectively had no representation and no support. 
Over the centuries many countries of the periphery had been occupied by aliens.  The Baltic 
States were freed from Russian rule after the First World War but were occupied again, this time by 
the Soviet Union, in 1940. The countries of Eastern Europe have, over the centuries, been occupied for 
various periods by Turkey, Prussia, Russia, and Austria. (It should be added that for ECE countries 
proper independence from the former Soviet Union is still young.) Furthermore, some inhabitants of 
the occupying countries acquired large estates in these countries and they continued to possess them 
even after the independence of those countries.  
In the European periphery land reforms began from the end of the 19
th century. In Bulgaria and 
Serbia land was distributed among the peasants after Turkish rule finished at the end of the 19
th 
century. Between the two world wars radical land reforms were carried out in Bulgaria and in the new 
states created after the First World War: in Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. (In the ECE the 
land distribution in Bulgaria was the most equal.)  The land reforms included expropriation of the land 
of citizens of the former occupiers or of “loser” countries. Among these expropriated landowners were 
many Russians, Turks, Muslims, Austrians, Germans and Hungarians living in different countries. The 
land of many citizens was expropriated by the governments in territories which were given to the new 
states as part of the peace accords after the First World War.  (Two-thirds of the Hungarian territory 
and one-third of the Hungarian population was distributed among the neighboring countries by the 
Trianon peace treaty after the First World War.) Ethnic discrimination was also practiced in the land 
reforms carried out after the Second World War in the ECE. The least radical land reforms were those 
of the 1920s and 1930s in Poland and in Hungary. In Poland - which was freed from the occupation of 
Germany, Austria and Russia after the First World War – a mere 20% of estates larger than 100 ha 
were distributed. In Hungary the government was a coalition which included the Smallholders Party 
but even so, a little less than 6% of the agricultural land area was distributed among peasants in the 
1920s. Furthermore, the Hungarian government paid large compensation to landlords who offered to 
give up some of their land.  
In many countries the late agrarian reforms were not accompanied with significant economic 
growth. In the ECE the only exception was democratic Czechoslovakia where quick industrialization 
and development took place. Development in the other countries of the ECE stagnated between the 
two World Wars. After the Second World War they became part of the Soviet sphere of interest and 
thus developed in a particular way different from that of other European countries. 
In countries where economic development stagnated the agricultural population remained large 
and its own development was stagnant. Agriculture was not modernized and manual labor was only 
partially replaced by mechanized work. The peasant way of life was preserved and did not approach 
the urban quality and standard of life. Migration to urban areas was small because the small urban 
industries could not absorb those trying to “escape” from the backward rural way of life. Many people 
emigrated to America in an attempt to get away from rural poverty.  
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A particular rural-nationalist ideology developed on the basis of peasant poverty and this, coupled 
with poverty and unemployment in cities, accompanying the initial development of capitalism, 
involved the belief that these were particular symptoms of capitalism at all.  
The rural nationalist ideology, struggling against and wanting to end poverty, had emerged at the 
end of the 19
th century (e.g. the narodniks in Russia) and blossomed in the first part of the 20
th century. 
However, some remnants of it have even survived right up until now. It sought the causes of poverty 
in the rule of capitalist, half-feudal landlords, in the lack of radical agricultural reforms and in 
capitalist urban development (Berend, 2000). Representatives of this sort of ideology were 
intellectuals – in Hungary mainly writers, sociologists, and politicians. They were generally of peasant 
origins but some of them came from gentry families. Between the two World Wars there were both 
leftists and rightists among them (some right-wingers were close to fascist movements), and also 
centrists.  Their monographs and literature about the poverty of rural people received great response at 
that time.  
Rural nationalists supported a form of anti-capitalist development which would be based on 
small-farm agriculture. They did not see any promising future in industry and industrial development. 
Hence they did not anticipate any decrease in the agricultural population. On the contrary, they held 
the growth of the latter as a nation-maintaining force as a desirable thing. According to them the 
remedies for rural social problems would involve radical agrarian reforms, land redistribution and the 
modernization of small farms. Land was a central point of their ideology (probably owing to its 
scarcity). Land was not only the embodiment of wealth but also the symbol of national being. 
According to their ideas land was equal with “mother earth”, and the peasantry which tilled it 
represented the nation. With the land and its maintenance in the hands of the peasantry it was 
protected from aliens. This was not only in the interests of  the agricultural population but also for the 
benefit of the whole nation. Being tied to the “mother earth” was set against the internationalism of the 
urban working class and the cosmopolitanism of the urban intelligentsia. 
Nationalist intelligentsia opposed not only urban capitalism but the urban intelligentsia as well. 
At the time of the initial development of capitalism the number of urban intellectuals was few and 
many of them had their origins in foreign families (i.e. they were from families which belonged to 
citizens of former occupiers and had remained in the country or immigrated into the country). Many 
industrialists, bankers, merchants and some big capitalist farmers were of the same origins. In Eastern 
European countries a lot of Jews and Germans had such occupations. This strengthened the anti-
capitalist feeling against the urban intelligentsia. In the rural nationalist ideology anti-capitalism was 
accompanied by sentiments against aliens - i. e. against those who had alien origins. They were often 
made responsible, among others, for the negative features of capitalism and the poverty of the nation. 
Nationalist gentries had another reason for their antipathy towards aliens. For a long time many 
members of the Hungarian gentry had used the incomes from their low-productivity farms to support a 
luxurious lifestyle. They became indebted, impoverished and eventually ended up as meagerly-paid 
employees of central and local government offices. They then accused the Jews of taking away from 
them the opportunities to become industrialists or bankers. The Hungarian intelligentsia was divided 
into two parts: rural-nationalists and urbanites.  Urbanites were regarded by many as Jews (although in 
fact there were many non-Jews among them). Thus emerged an ideology connected with the primacy 
of small farm development opposed to capitalist industrial development, accompanied with sentiments 
against aliens. 
  At its height the roots of the ideology could be seen in the backward economy, the big 
agricultural population, land scarcity, memories of long foreign occupations, and envy at the fortunes 
accumulated by some aliens.  
Some political parties – such as those that claimed to represent peasants,  smallholder and 
agrarian parties - and some other political movements took over the rural nationalist ideology. These, 
generally small parties, represented the interests of the peasantry and smallholders in the parliaments 
which existed between the two World Wars. There were also bigger parties among them: e.g. in 
Czechoslovakia the Agrarian Party. Some of them were leftists, some rightists, and some centre 
rightists. Their role in national politics depended either on the number of seats they had in parliament 
(and their alliances under a system of democratic rule), or on the political system of the country. For 
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in parliament which could not endanger its rule. This kind of party was the Smallholders Party, which 
virtually had complete control of the Ministry of Agriculture  in the early 1920s. It carried out a land 
reform which, while appearing to be progressive, did not endanger any big estate and hardly increased 
the land area held by smallholders. 
 
The survival of rural nationalism 
 
Many things have changed in the economy and in politics since the Second World War. The role 
of agriculture has diminished even in the most backward countries of the European periphery. The 
number of people working in agriculture has significantly fallen and the land scarcity has decreased 
with it. However, ideologies generally last longer than the social bases on which they originally 
developed. 
Rural nationalism is a branch of nationalism as a whole. It can easily be converted to, or 
connected with other nationalist ideologies. Although in the ECE socialist countries it was forbidden 
to promulgate nationalist principles, they lived  on tacitly and were spread in a veiled manner. In 
Hungary some politicians of rural origin, acting in the ruling Socialist Party even had such attitudes.  
In Hungary there was a great increase in the living standards of the agricultural population during 
the 1970s and 1980s, which included workers and employees of production co-operatives and state 
farms. This made their quality of life much higher relative to the earlier living standards of agricultural 
workers and individual small farmers (Burger, 2003).  Consequently, the rural-nationalist ideology did 
not receive the public reflection it had been given earlier. Nationalism therefore shifted towards ethnic 
problems, to questions of the suppression of the ethnic Hungarians in the territories lost to neighboring 
countries after the First World War, and to the damaging consequences of the decreasing ethnic 
Hungarian population and the growing gipsy population. Irredentism - i. e. claiming back the 
territories taken away after the First World War - was an official governmental ideology before the 
end of the Second World War.  However, it did not have a big role in the ideology of rural nationalists 
who in general, opposed the policy of the government. Nevertheless, after the war the rural nationalists 
also integrated this into their ideas. Hidden anti-Semitism could also be found.  
Since the beginning of the systemic changes at the end of the 1980s all the tendencies of 
nationalism have reappeared. There has been a revival of agricultural smallholdings with many poor 
subsistent producers; the latter have provided a base for rural nationalism again. It has to be 
mentioned, however, that rural nationalists are in some ways more responsible for the “new” poverty 
than some political and economic factors.  
The agrarian and also some other political parties in the former socialist countries (except 
Albania) argued for, and achieved a situation in which a great part of their agricultural land was not 
privatized for the benefit of the users (i.e. for the members, workers and employees of production co-
operatives and state farms) but for the earlier owners or their heirs. The restitution of land was 
different from the privatization of industry and other sectors of the economy where, with local 
variations, reprivatization, or the return of property to former owners has rarely taken place. In the 
case of industry property has been sold, or distributed freely, or there have been buy-outs by managers 
and workers.  Generally some small compensation was paid for wealth that had been confiscated, 
albeit less than its real value.   
In agriculture something different happened. For instance, in Czechoslovakia (and also in East 
Germany) all the former owners had maintained their titles to their land in the land registration 
records. They received back their land. In Hungary only those owners received back their land who 
had remained as members of co-operatives and had kept their title deeds.  Those who had left the co-
operative farms were forced to sell their land at low prices to the co-operatives and did not keep their 
original title deeds to it.  
The Hungarian Smallholders Party (the successor of the old party which had played an active role 
before the Second World War) was a part of the central-right wing coalition government in the “first 
free Parliament” between 1990-94, and it had 12% of the votes. This party was instrumental   in 
pushing a law through parliament - against the intention of the government majority - to ensure that all 
the earlier owners who had owned land after the land reform of 1945 should receive that land back. It 
was claimed that the aim of this law was to reestablish the agricultural system of individual, private 
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it had been accepted by the Parliament. The reason given by the Court was that one particular group of 
the population should not be handled differently from those others who received only compensation 
bonds for their confiscated property. Evading the decision of the Court, the Smallholders Party gained 
acceptance for a policy which made it possible for compensation bonds to be used by former owners 
in order to claim vouchers that would enable them to bid for land held by co-operative farms and 
partly by state farms at compulsory auctions. Since the value of the compensation bonds fell far short 
of any property taken during the process of nationalization, in the case of land the state offered 
subsidies for up to 50 hectares. The result was that the average agricultural land property became 3 ha 
(Agricultural Policies, 1999) and four-fifths of the co-operative land area went into the ownership of 
outsiders. Although the land restitution techniques were different in other transition countries, the 
results were similar.  
Absentee ownership became widespread. Large farms now had to rent land from absentee 
owners. The effect of this was to increase production costs and diminish incomes.   It has to be 
mentioned that some of the farmers possessing the biggest holdings were among those who had forced 
through, and supported land restitution to former owners. 
The production and incomes from agriculture have fallen enormously since the transition in many 
ECE countries. The causes have been many-sided, but the manner of privatization has had a 
significant role among them. The agrarian and other right-wing parties blamed the co-operatives and 
their managers (in Hungary they called them “green barons”) for the bad agricultural situation. They 
demanded the liquidation of co-operatives and the companies organized by some co-operatives and 
state farms. They held it necessary that a total redistribution of land take place among smallholders. 
They regarded the lifestyle of the old individual smallholders to be ideal and opposed any large 
farming and co-operation as something strange and alien to the peasant mentality.  
In the more developed industrial and agricultural ECE countries support for the liquidation of co-
operatives and other large farms was small (in contrast to the less developed countries such as 
Romania and Bulgaria). In the more developed countries - such as in the former Czechoslovakia and 
in Hungary - large farms were well-mechanized and yields were fairly high, thus ensuring  higher 
living standards than before collectivization for the much smaller rural population; the opposite was 
the case in the less developed ECE countries.  Large farms were not sufficiently mechanized there, 
yields were low, agricultural incomes were low, labor requirements were high, and the agricultural 
population was relatively big. More descendants of former owners lived in rural areas and worked 
there than in the more developed ECE countries. Therefore many more rural people wanted land for 
subsistence farming. The support for land redistribution and its restitution to former owners, and also 
the liquidation of collective farms, was also greater. 
However, these tendencies were not so evident in the agriculture of the more developed countries. 
 Owing to resistance to the dissolution of the large farms of many people working in agriculture, most 
large-scale farms have survived in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Agricultural Policies, 1999) and 
about 50% of agricultural land is used by large farms in Hungary. (It has to be mentioned that later on 
some of the large farms were also reorganized in Romania and Bulgaria.) Even in the eastern part of 
Germany about 50% of agricultural land belongs to large-scale farms.   
Large farms have everywhere been reorganized into companies and “new-type” co-operatives. In 
general they have become smaller, engaging less workers and employees and producing less than 
earlier. The economic situation of most of them is not very good but it is often better than that of the 
country’s agriculture as a whole (the latter having deteriorated significantly since the transition).  
However, the Hungarian Smallholders Party was not satisfied with the sort of development 
mentioned above. Thus during its membership of the 1990-1994 centre- right coalition government it 
attempted to force through laws in co-operation with other right-wing and nationalist forces. These 
laws were intended to ensure that co-operative farms and their companies, and also foreigners would 
be prohibited from owning land. The aim of the laws was also to prevent the strengthening of large 
farms and to protect Hungarian smallholders against domestic and foreign competition. The party in 
charge of the Agricultural Ministry in both the 1990-94 and 1998-2002 center-right coalition 
governments – a party  which had about 12% of votes in both - often took discriminative measures 
against the reorganized large farms in order to weaken them.  
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one million people who are farming in some form in Hungary there are not more than 10% whose 
annual production value is between 4000 and 20000 euros and only  1% is above 20000 euros 
(Agriculture in Hungary, 2000).  There are not more than 55,000 full-time farmers and only a few of 
them are economically strong. 
More land and property concentration, more capital, more co-operation and vertical production, 
processing and trading-integration: these are needed for the development of agriculture. Lifting the 
buying restrictions could promote foreign direct investment and stimulate the land market. These 
would contribute to a cessation of the separation of land-use and land-ownership. 
    
Conclusions 
 
 Rural nationalism, as part of nationalism as a whole, has  survived in the transition countries. 
Although the role of agriculture has diminished, the number of people working in agriculture has 
significantly fallen, and land scarcity has decreased, land has remained a crucial point in the ideology. 
Protecting it from aliens means protection of “mother earth” and of national being. Protecting small 
farmers means suppressing large farms and hampering land concentration. It is true that only a part of 
the population supports rural nationalism, but politicians must pay attention to it, even when they do 
not agree with it. This is the reason why, in the negotiations about accession to the EU, an important 
question concerned exemption from EU rules with respect to the acquisition of land by foreigners. 
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